Labor supply theory makes strong predictions about how the introduction of a social welfare program impacts work effort. Although there is a large literature on the work incentive effects of AFDC and the EITC, relatively little is known about the work incentive effects of the Food Stamp Program and none of the existing literature is based on quasi-experimental methods. We use the cross-county introduction of the program in the 1960s and 1970s to estimate the impact of the program on the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply, earnings, and family cash income. Consistent with theory, we find modest reductions in employment and hours worked when food stamps are introduced. The results are larger for single-parent families. (JEL No. H31, J22) We are grateful to Bob Schoeni and Donna Nordquist for help with the PSID.
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I. Introduction
A central question in public finance, one that has generated decades of research, is how tax and transfer programs affect labor supply. The early literature typically estimated cross sectional models thereby ignoring the endogeneity of net wages, net income, and selection into transfer programs. Concerns about biases from these cross sectional approaches led to methodological innovations, in particular structural modeling in the presence of kinked budget constraints.
1 Structural approaches had their own limitations, including concerns about sensitivity to choice of utility function, stochastic assumptions, and so on. The "new public finance" approach followed, with a reliance on using policy-induced variation and quasi-experimental methods to analyze impacts on labor supply. Quasi-experimental approaches have been used to analyze the impact of wide range of policies on labor supply such as federal taxes, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Medicaid, social security, and welfare reform.
Our paper contributes to the literature on taxes, transfers and labor supply by using a quasiexperimental approach to estimate the impact of the food stamp program (FSP) on labor supply. The
FSP is a federal means tested program, providing benefits to buy food for families who are income and asset eligible. Importantly, while the primary goal of the food stamp program is to increase food consumption, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) show that most households are inframarginal and thus food stamp benefits can be treated as an income transfer.
Food stamp benefits are the fundamental safety net in the U.S., being the only public assistance program that is available to all family types (most programs are targeted on female headed households, children, or the elderly). In fact, Food stamps is the largest cash U.S. cash or near cash means tested transfer program with spending in 2009 of 50 billion dollars compared to 30 billion for TANF and 40 billion for the federal EITC.
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The importance of the FSP program is particularly apparent in the current great recession, where more than 1 in 9 persons is receiving food stamps.
Today, food stamp benefits (recently renamed Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP benefits) are paid via electronic debit card that can be swiped at the checkout line like a debit card, and can be used to purchase most grocery store food goods. Recipients are allotted a benefit amount B equal to the difference between the federally defined maximum benefit level for a given family size (i.e. G, the guarantee amount) and the amount that the family is deemed to be able to afford to pay for food on its own according to the benefits formula (essentially 30 percent of cash income, less some deductions). During the time period studied here, the program was slightly different. Through 1978, there was a "purchase requirement" which allowed recipients to buy G dollars worth of food stamp coupons for a price P set by a federal schedule and capped to be no higher than 30 percent of income Y.
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The difference between G and P is called the "bonus coupon amount" and is analogous to today's benefit level. During this period, benefits were paid out via coupons that were slightly smaller than dollar bills that could be used to purchase almost all food goods at grocery stores. 4 A central challenge for the empirical food stamp literature is that the program is federal and exhibits no variation across states, which is an approach commonly used in the quasi-experimental literature.
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Further, the universal nature of the program means there are no ineligible groups to serve as controls, which is another common approach in the quasi-experimental literature. Instead, the typical food stamp study in some way compares recipients to nonrecipients leading to a possible bias if there is selection into program participation (Currie 2003) . The small existing literature on the labor supply effects of the food stamp program uses structural estimation with little attention to exogenous variation in the program. 6 In this paper, we take a very different approach to estimating the labor supply effects of the FSP using the introduction of the program as it was phased in across U.S. counties over a relatively gradual period. We utilize the natural experiment afforded by the nationwide roll-out of the modern Food Stamp Program during the 1960s and early 1970s. Our identification strategy uses the sharp timing of the county-by-county rollout of the FSP, which was initially constrained by congressional funding authorizations (and ultimately became available in all counties by 1975). While the existing literature limits attention to hours worked, we examine the impacts of the program on labor force participation, annual hours, earnings, and total family cash income. Further, reflecting the universal eligibility in the FSP, we examine impacts on all families, including married couples and female headed households. Our "program introduction" research design has the appeal of relying on nonmarginal changes in incentives faced by consumers.
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Safety net programs, such as AFDC, TANF and food stamps, are designed to insure a basic level of consumption in low-income families. Consequently, benefits in traditional income support programs feature a guarantee-a benefit level if the family has no income. As earnings or income increases, benefits are reduced leading to an implicit tax rate on earnings (called the benefit reduction rate or BRR). As described above, benefits in the FSP take this form; for example in 2010 a family of three has a food stamp guarantee of $526 per month and the benefit is phased-out using a benefit 6 These studies include Fraker and Moffitt (1988) , Hagstrom (1996) , and Keane and Moffitt (1998) and are discussed below. 7 This "program introduction" research design has been taken in recent analyses of other social programs such as Head Start (Ludwig and Miller 2007) , Medicare (Finkelstein and McKnight 2008) , Title I (Cascio et al. 2006) , and in our own prior work on the food stamp program (Almond, Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2010, Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009). reduction rate of 30 percent.
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Notably, the benefit reduction rate in the food stamp program is lower than the rate under the old AFDC program or most states' TANF programs.
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As is well known, a family's labor supply response to the income transfer program may partially offset the income and consumption enhancing goals of the program. The guarantee produces an income effect and the benefit reduction rate reduces the net wage leading to an income and substation effect. Standard static labor supply theory predicts that the program will reduce labor supply on both the extensive (employment) and intensive (hours conditional on work) margins. As a result, it may cost more than $1 in income support payments to increase a low-income family's available cash and near-cash resources by $1.
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968-1978 to examine the impact of the FSP on labor supply, earnings, and income. We employ a difference-in-difference model where the treatment is at the county level, with controls for county and year fixed effects and state linear time trends. In this model, identification requires that there are no contemporaneous county level trends that are correlated with food stamp introduction and family economic outcomes.
We also estimate a triple difference model that uses variation across subgroups with varying propensities of being affected by food stamps. Our results are robust to adding controls for possible confounders and we also present event study models that further support the validity of the research design.
Overall, our results indicate that people behave as the theory predicts. In the pooled (full) sample we find modest reductions in employment and hours worked after food stamp benefits are introduced. The impacts are larger but also less precisely estimated when limited to female headed households. We find no significant impacts of the FSP on earnings or family income.
8 There are additional deductions for dependent care, child support, medical costs, high housing costs, and 20 percent of earned income. 9 Up until 1967, the benefit reduction rate in the AFDC program was 100%. It was reduced to 67% in 1967, then increased again to 100% in 1981. After federal welfare reform, and the conversion to TANF, there is substantial variation across states in the programs' BRR.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II summarizes the prior literatures and Section III provides a history and summary of the Food Stamp Program. Section IV describes the expected effects of the FSP on labor supply and Section V describes the data. Section VI presents the results and Section VII discusses the results in the context of the existing literature. Section VIII concludes.
II. Prior Literature
While there is a sizable literature examining the impacts of the food stamp program on family consumption, nutrition, and family well-being, there is little research examining its impacts on labor supply. The prior literature, which is based mostly on structural estimation, finds modest impacts of the FSP on labor supply.
The prior studies of the effect of FSP on labor supply include Fraker and Moffitt (1988) , Hagstrom (1996) , and Keane and Moffitt (1998) . Fraker and Moffitt (1988) use structural models and kinked budget constraints to estimate the impact of food stamps on labor supply for a sample of female heads of household. They specify a utility function and model the choice of hours of work (zero, part time, full time) and participation in the AFDC and food stamp programs. Fraker and Moffitt find that the FSP reduces hours of work by participants by 1 hour per week among food stamp recipients, or since mean weekly hours worked for Food Stamp participants is about 9.5, a 9 percent reduction. Keane and Moffitt (1998) extend this paper, also looking at female headed households, by simultaneously modeling AFDC, food stamps, Medicaid and housing benefits. They find larger elasticities than Fraker and Moffitt, but do not report simulations for -effect of the overall FSP on labor supply. Hagstrom (1996) estimates the impact of the FSP on married couple's labor supply using a multinomial logit model. He reports small impacts of changes in the food stamp guarantee and BRR on labor supply but does not report simulations for the total effect of the FSP on labor supply. Notably, all of these studies use cross sectional models where food stamp benefits do not vary across families.
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Moffitt (2002) summarizes the literature by concluding "the Food Stamp program has little effect on work disincentives." In this paper, we find labor supply effects that are larger than the prior literature.
The vast literature on labor supply effects of a variety of income transfer programs is well summarized elsewhere (Moffitt 1992; Hoynes 1997; Moffitt 2002) . The empirical literature on the AFDC program may also be useful here because there is substantial overlap in participation between the two programs. The general findings from the literature on the AFDC program (which provided cash income support) are that AFDC reduces labor supply among program participants by 10 to 50 percent. In particular, the influential paper by Moffitt (1983) 
III. Introduction of the Food Stamp Program
President Kennedy's first executive order was to introduce the modern Food Stamp Program by establishing eight county-level programs. The number of pilot programs grew to 43 by 1963. The pilot programs were seen as a great success, and were credited for improving diets of low-income families while also strengthening markets for farm commodities (Johnson, 1964 Berry (1984) , funding limits were a major factor in the timing that counties moved off of the waiting list and were able to start up their program: "The program was quite in demand, as congressmen wanted to reap the good will and publicity that accompanied the opening of a new project. At this time there was always a long waiting list of counties that wanted to join the program. Only funding controlled the growth of the program as it expanded" (pp. 36-37).
In this paper we rely on variation across counties in the timing of the original introduction of the FSP to isolate the impact of the program on labor supply behavior. Consequently the causal identification of the impact of FSP relies on the exogeneity of the county implementation of the program. An important starting point is to recognize that counties applied for funds to start a local food stamp program and were funded subject to current allocations by Congress. Notably, the county application was voluntary.
In the early 1960s, some counties provided food aid to the poor via the Commodity Distribution Program (CDP). The Federal government would purchase surplus commodities to support farmers and distribute a portion of them directly to low-income families. The CDP was criticized not only for being inefficient relative to normal market channels for distributing food, but also because the timing of the goods distribution was irregular and only a narrow variety of commodities were available. These findings are consistent with Berry's characterization that the exact timing of FSP introduction across counties was driven largely by fiscal constraints and not the lack of desire by counties to introduce the program.
The FSP was introduced around the same time as other programs that were part of the federal "war on poverty." For example, this period included the introduction of Medicaid, Medicare, Head Start, and the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), and saw expansions of AFDC, Social Security, and disability insurance programs. If these other programs 13 We drop observations from Alaska throughout the paper due to inconsistencies in mapping FSP service areas to standard county FIPS codes. Here we also drop the (few) counties where the percent of land used for farming is greater than 100 percent, and very small counties with population less than 1,000 because of missing data. mainly varied at the state level, then our controls for state linear time trends or state-year fixed effects should absorb their impacts. Nonetheless, to control for possible coincident expansions of other programs we also include annual measures of county per-capita transfer payments for cash income support, medical care, and retirement and disability programs (see data section below).
IV. Labor Supply Predictions of Food Stamp Introduction
Food stamp benefits have the structure of a traditional income support program, with a guaranteed income benefit which is reduced with family income at the legislated benefit reduction rate. We illustrate the labor-leisure tradeoff with and without food stamps in Figure 2 . Like other means-tested programs, the FSP alters the household's labor-leisure tradeoff increasing after tax and transfer income at earnings up to the breakeven point. In particular, the food stamp benefit is largest at zero hours of work, and benefits are reduced as income and earnings are increased leading to an implicit tax rate on earned income. The benefit reduction rate in the food stamp program is 30 percent, which is lower than other means tested transfer programs (e.g. 67 or 100 percent in AFDC, the precursor to TANF).
14 In Figure 2a , the x axis measures the amount of leisure consumed, and the y axis measures total income including the cash value of in-kind transfers through the food stamp program.
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Prior to the introduction of the FSP, the budget constraint is a straight line with a slope equal to the individual's wage W. The simple static labor supply model states that an individual maximizes her utility subject to this budget constraint, and assuming a positive labor supply choice, chooses some combination of consumption of goods and leisure at points illustrated for consumers with different preferences by A and A^, consuming leisure in amount  and ^, respectively. If her offer wage is below her reservation wage (the slope of the indifference curve at zero hours of work) then it will be optimal to remain out of the labor force, as illustrated by point A  (at maximum leisure choice  , or hours=0).
As illustrated in Figure 2b , the introduction of the FSP alters the budget constraint by adding non-labor income G, and rotating the slope of the budget constraint to W(1-t) where t is the tax rate on benefits as income increases (0.3 during this time period). For the individual supplying zero hours of work and consuming only leisure, consumption opportunities increase by the FSP "guarantee" amount G.
As is well known in the analysis of traditional income support programs, this combination of a guaranteed income and benefit reduction rate leads unambiguously to predictions of reductions in the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply. In this case, both the income effect of the benefit as well as the income and substitution effect from the benefit reduction rate leads, unambiguously, to a predicted decline in employment (extensive margin), hours worked (intensive margin), and ( '   . Alternatively, it is possible that the combination of the negative income and substitution effects can push them out of labor market to point A^'.
As discussed above, the FSP is run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and throughout most of its history the benefit and eligibility criteria have been uniform across states. Thus, at a point in time, the guarantee and benefit reduction rate are constant across all eligible families of a given family size. 16 The prior literature examines the period after the FSP was expanded to a national program. Without variation across states that is often utilized in analysis of government programs, the literature relies on structural estimation where the emphasis is on identifying parameters of the utility function. Despite no variation in the FSP program parameters G and t, by estimating the parameters of the utility function in the presence of the budget constraint, the studies simulate the effect of marginal changes to the FSP (change in G or t) or out of sample predictions of the total effect of the FSP. Instead, we use the rollout of the FSP in a quasi-experimental difference-indifference design whereby we compare counties that have implemented the FSP to other counties who have not yet implanted. We measure whether family labor supply responds to the introduction of the program as predicted by economic theory. Notably, this is a non-marginal calculation; instead we identify the labor supply with and without the program in place.
V. Data
In order to utilize the county-level variation in FSP rollout, we require a dataset that covers as much of the rollout period as possible (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) and provides information on county of residence.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a panel data set that began in 1968 with a sample of about 5,000 households. Subsequently all members and descendants of the original survey families were re-interviewed annually. The original 1968 sample consists of two subsamples: a nationally representative subsample of 3,000 households (Survey Research Center subsample) and a subsample of 1,900 households selected from an existing sample of low income and minority populations (Survey of Economic Opportunity subsample). To adjust for this nonrandom composition, the PSID includes weights designed to eliminate biases attributable to attrition, and to the oversampling of low income groups. All analyses use the weights provided by the PSID. 16 The food stamp guarantee, G, varies by size of family.
The central focus of the PSID is labor market and demographic variables, containing substantial detail on income, employment, and family composition. From this, we measure the annual hours worked and annual earnings over the previous year for both the household head and spouse (if applicable), whether the family reports receiving any food stamp benefits, and total annual family cash income (not including the value of food stamps). We use data from interview years 1968 to 1978.
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We stop the sample in 1978 because of a significant change in the structure of food stamp payments that begins in 1979. 18 We limit the sample to include families with a family head that is less than 65. We exclude elderly families because they have lower food stamp takeup rates (see Appendix Table 2 ) and are less attached to the labor market. Our nonelderly headed sample consists of 48,168 family-year observations. In some specifications, we limit the sample to nonelderly heads with a high school education or less (37,474 observations), female headed households with children (7,280 observations), or nonwhite, female headed households with children (5,464 observations) to represent samples with a higher FSP participation rates. Note, unlike other means tested transfer programs, the FSP is available to married and unmarried families alike as long as they are income eligible. Reflecting their lower family incomes, however, female headed households have significantly higher eligibility and participation rates compared to their married counterparts.
Appendix Table 3 presents some basic descriptive statistics for the main analysis samples.
All dollar amounts are in 2005 dollars. Over 90 percent of heads report working at some point in the previous year in the overall sample, with 1,947 average annual hours. Female headed households report much lower rates of employment (71 percent overall, and 62 percent for nonwhite female heads) and hours worked (1068 and 864, respectively). 17 We have to drop the food stamp variable for the 1969 interview year because the survey does not separate FSP benefits from other sources of food assistance (e.g. commodity distribution program, other in-kind benefits) in that year. This reduces our sample sizes when FSP participation is the dependent variable. 18 Most notably, the purchase requirement was eliminated. As a result, participants were simply given stamps worth the bonus coupon amount B instead of having to purchase the entire G amount of food stamps at a discounted price.
The public-use release of the PSID includes only state level identifiers for each family-year.
Through special arrangement, we have obtained county level identifiers for each family in each year.
We merge the PSID data using these county identifiers with three additional data sets of county 
VI. Results
a. Difference-in-Difference Approach
We begin by estimating a difference-in-difference model using the 1968-78 PSID. This compares labor supply measures across counties and over time relative to when the FSP was introduced. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
( As described in Section IV above, we include pre-treatment county characteristics (CB60) interacted with linear time trends to control for the observable determinants of county food stamp adoption. The variables in CB60 include the percent of land in farming and the percent of population black, urban, age less than five, age greater than 65 and with income less than $3,000. We also include per-capita county income transfers (REIS ct ) for (1) retirement and disability programs, (2) medical care (Medicare, Medicare, and military health care), and (3) cash public assistance (AFDC, SSI, and general assistance) to control for coincident introduction or expansion of other programs that are not swept out by state linear time trends or state*year fixed effects. All estimates are weighted using the PSID family weight, and standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Results are presented in Table 1 . Each cell provides estimates from a separate regression and only the coefficient on the FSP availability variable is reported (along with the mean of the dependent variable). Columns (1)- (2) The results in column (1) and (2) indicate no effect of FSP introduction on head's work behavior in the overall nonelderly population. Note that hours and earnings are unconditional measures -that is, they include zero values for nonworkers. Any measured effect, therefore, can come about from a change in the extensive or intensive margins of work. We similarly find in Panel E no impact of FSP on log of family income.
Our identification strategy is based on the introduction of a county-level FSP program, but only the low-income residents of treated counties who are eligible to enroll (and, further, who actually do enroll in the program) should be directly impacted by the program. As shown in Appendix Table 2 , program participation varies widely with education, race and family type.
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To account for this, we first limit the overall sample to sub-groups that are likely to be impacted by the program (and similarly, in Table 3 we show placebo regressions limited to sub-groups that are unlikely to be impacted by the program).
Columns ( annual earnings and log of family income both appear to decline as well, but the effects are not precisely estimated.
Finally, we further limit the sample to nonwhite female-headed families in columns (7)-(8).
The estimated first stage of food stamp takeup rate is largest for these families with an estimated 25 to 38 percent reporting receipt of food stamps after the program is introduced. These families appear to adjust on the extensive margin, with estimates varying from insignificant 4.8 to a statistically significant 9.7 percentage point reduction in labor force participation. Annual hours worked and earnings (which, as noted above, include zeros for non-workers) decline commensurately and are statistically significantly different from zero. The impact on overall family cash income is imprecise and not consistently signed across the specifications.
The estimates in Table 1 represent average treatment effects across the sub-sample, which includes FSP participants and nonparticipants. We can use the average participation rates in Appendix Table 2 to convert the estimates to the implied treatment on the treated (TOT) effect by dividing the coefficient by the sample's FSP participation rate.
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This suggests a TOT effect on annual hours of 500-650 hours for female headed households and 289-517 for nonwhite female headed households.
Existing evidence suggests that the labor supply of a family's secondary worker is more responsive to income transfer programs, so we might expect the spouse's labor supply to decline by more than the head's in a married-couple family (Eissa and Hoynes 2006; Hoynes 1996) . To test this, in Table 2 we present results limited to married couple families and show the impact of FSP introduction on labor supply separately for heads and spouses.
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As in Table 1 , the odd columns control for state-by-linear time trends while the even columns include state-by-year fixed effects.
Columns (1) and (2) present results for all nonelderly married families. Only 2 percent of families in this sample report receiving benefits after the FSP is introduced. There is no evidence in this sample that heads or spouses alter their labor supply efforts in response to the introduction of the program.
Head's annual employment status, hours and earnings are never statistically significantly impacted by FSP introduction, and the point estimate is usually positive. Spouse's employment behavior in this overall sample is never statistically significantly impacted although the point estimates are consistent with a work disincentive effect of food stamps.
In columns (3) and (4) we target the sample to married couples where the head has a high school diploma or less. Here the takeup rate of the program is only slightly higher -3 percent of the sample reports receiving benefits -and the impacts on head and spouse labor supply are also reasonably precisely estimated zeroes. The results so far suggest that it is primarily single female household heads that alter their labor supply in response to the FSP. 22 We inflate by the participation rates in Appendix Table 2 instead of the (smaller) coefficient from Panel A for consistency with the triple-difference results reported further below. 23 In most, but not all families, the head is male and the spouse is female. For this reason we will continue to use the terms head/spouse rather than husband/wife.
As a check to insure that the labor market findings are not spurious, in Table 3 we present placebo regressions looking for signs of an "effect" of the FSP on groups that are unlikely to have received treatment. Columns (1) and (2) report results for all high-income (defined as annual income greater than $50,000 in inflation-adjusted 2005 dollars) families, the next pair of columns limits the sample to high-income married couples with children, and the final pair limits the sample even further to white married high-income families with children. As shown in Panel A, these families are very unlikely to report receiving any food stamp benefits. The coefficients on head's employment, hours worked and earnings are small and not statistically different from zero. The sign on annual earnings is generally wrong-signed -indicating an increase in earnings after FSP is introduced in their county -with sizeable standard errors. Effects on spouse reporting any employment here are small and generally wrong-signed, while spousal hours worked and earnings bounce around and are imprecise. These findings indicate that there is no "treatment effect" on families that do not receive treatment and lend further credibility to our research design.
b. Triple-difference approach
Unlike virtually all other U.S. public assistance programs, there is no categorical eligibility for the food stamp program. That is, eligibility depends on income and asset tests but it is not targeted to particular demographic groups, such as single parents with children. This argues for using broad samples, such as all nonelderly families or low educated nonelderly families as we did above.
However, it is clear from the analysis in Tables 1 and 2 that we may not have the power to detect effects in a broad sample.
At the same time, the participation rates in Appendix Table 2 show that while food stamp participation is highest among single parent families with children, the participation is widespread and varying across many demographic groups. For example, among families where the head has less than 12 years of education, 14 percent of married couples with children and 14 percent of single nonelderly persons with no children participate in food stamps (compared to 46 percent of single parent families with children). The rates are uniformly higher among black families, with 56 percent of single nonelderly parent families with children (where the head has less than 12 years of education) participating in food stamps.
In the end, in choosing our preferred sample for this analysis, we face a tradeoff between sample size (using the larger sample of nonelderly families but with overall lower participation rates) and targeting (using the smaller sample female heads of household with higher participation rates).
Here, we refine these earlier results by using the nonelderly sample, but adopting a triple-difference specification that accounts for different probabilities of being affected by food stamps. Using the participation rates in Appendix 
In addition to the variables include in equation (1), we also include fixed effects for group and group linear time trends. We include the main effect for FSP as well as the interaction with P g . The coefficient on the main effect can be interpreted as the impact on a group with zero risk of being on food stamps, and we therefore expect the coefficient on the main effect to be zero.
The results are presented in Table 4 . In column (1) we include state linear time trends, in column (2) we include state by year fixed effects, and in column (3) we augment equation (2) with interaction terms between P g and all control variables. This is a triple-difference specification: across counties, over time, and across groups. Because we inflate by participation rate, the coefficient of interest, δ, can be interpreted as the impact of the treatment on the treated.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with the theoretical predictions that the introduction of an income support program induces households to consume more leisure. Further, the results are remarkably consistent across specifications. Participating heads reduce employment by 24 to 27 percentage points when the FSP is introduced in the county. Head's annual hours also appear to decline with p-values hovering just over 10 percent. The point estimates on earnings and log family income suggest a commensurate decline, but the estimates never approach statistical significance. In each case, as expected, the coefficients on the main effect for FSP are uniformly small and not different from zero. This is a placebo-test of sorts and the small coefficients give us additional confidence about the validity of our design. 
c. Event study analysis
Our results so far have been quite robust to different ways of controlling for confounding background characteristics. This suggests that our results are identified off of discrete changes in outcomes at the time of FSP introduction. If instead identification were being driven by underlying trends or variation in other characteristics, we would expect more sensitivity of our coefficients to changes in the manner we account for these possible confounders.
To directly examine the timing of the shifts in labor supply relative to the introduction of FSP, we return to the female headed household sample and conduct an event study analysis. We use the female headed household sample because they have the highest FSP participation rates and largest responses to FSP introduction in the results presented above. The event study approach requires a discrete treatment, so using the full sample with adjustment for group specific participation rates does not lend itself to this approach.
The advantage of an event study analysis is it traces out the trend in labor supply year-byyear for the periods leading up to and following FSP adoption. This allows for rigorous testing of a "pre-trend," the presence of which would raise concerns about our identification strategy. It also allows for an analysis of the dynamics of the policy effect-for example whether they grow with time since adoption. We are able to estimate an event study analysis here because we have a discrete policy variable that is implemented at different times across the counties in our sample.
Specifically, we estimate the following equation: (3) where τ ct denotes the year relative to the introduction of the FSP, defined so that if for county c the FSP began at any point in calendar year t. For τ ct <0, work effort decisions were made prior to the introduction of the FSP. All coefficients are measured relative to the omitted coefficient ( ). We run the model with and without the inclusion of our controls for potential FSP policy endogeneity (that is, the 1960 county characteristics interacted with linear time trends and REIS county controls) and include state linear time trends (μ st ). In order to eliminate potential compositional effects, we restrict the sample to a balanced panel of counties having observations for all 7 event periods (3 years prior to FSP implementation and 3 years afterwards). Because our data begin in 1968, this means we exclude counties where FSP started in 1970 or earlier.
We produce event study graphs for each of the labor supply outcomes for the female headed households. Figure 3A plots the event-year coefficients from the estimation of equation (3) The remaining panels in Figure 3 shows impacts of food stamp introduction on head's annual earnings and the log of family income. Figure 3C , which reports estimates on head's earnings, may show a small downward trend prior to the introduction of FSP, but there is still a sharp drop in earnings immediately following the introduction of the program. Finally, Figure 3D , which reports estimates for (log) family income, the impact of FSP here is -consistent with the small and imprecise coefficients in the earlier tables -not sharp and does not imply an important impact of FSP on total income.
d. Specification check using Decennial Census
As a final robustness check, we estimate the impact of FSP program introduction on labor supply using public use decennial Census data from the county-level aggregate files-known as the STF files. Here, we are limited to the variables and samples that have been pre-tabulated by the Census. We are able to estimate models for female labor force participation rates, male labor force participation rates, labor force participation rates for women with a child under age six, and the fraction of families with income below 10,000 (in real 1979 dollars).
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We pool county outcomes from the 1960, 1970 and 1980 Censuses and estimate models similar to those presented above, with decade fixed effects replacing the year fixed effects. The regressions are weighted using county population and the standard errors are clustered on county. The results are presented in Table 6 with panel A reporting estimates for all persons and panel B reporting estimates for nonwhites (for variables that are available).
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It is important to note that these treatment groups are broader than the targeted samples used in the PSID and there is no way to weight the treatment by group participation rate because the data are county wide averages. With that said, the results show a relatively statistically precise, small negative estimated work disincentive effect. For example, the estimate for males (females) shows that implementing a food stamp program leads to a statistically significant 0.003 (0.002) decrease in the labor force participation rate compared to the mean value of 0.76 (0.40). Using an average participation rate of 7.4, these imply TOT impacts on women of 2.7 percentage points (in italics in the table) or about 7 percent. For men, the TOT impacts are 4.1 percentage points or 5 percent. In addition, the probability that overall family cash income (not including food stamps) is less than $10,000 per year (in 1979 dollars) increases by a statistically significant 1 to 3 percentage points.
VII. Discussion
Overall, the evidence from the PSID and decennial Census is consistent with our theoretical predictions. We generally find that the introduction of the food stamp program leads to lower rates of employment and hours. The evidence is less clear for earnings and family income as our results never 24 The labor force participation rates are defined for persons age 16 and over. 25 The smallest geographic area identified in the census public use micro data is the county group, these are contiguous groups of counties with a combined population of 100,000 or more We estimated models using the 1970 and 1980 public use micro data IPUMS data where we aggregated the FSP treatment across all counties in the country group. Further, we had to combine county groups to accommodate the changing county group boundaries between the 1970 and 1980 Census. In the end, this aggregation was substantial and the results had very low power. The results are available on request.
approach statistical significance for these outcomes. The validity of the research design and estimates is confirmed by several additional results. First, the impacts are larger in subsamples with higher participation rates (e.g. female heads of household) and essentially zero for placebo groups such as highly educated married couples. Second, the event study results show that the policy introduction is unrelated to trends in the outcome variables, and labor supply sharply declines with the introduction of the program. Beyond the sign and statistical significance, however, what do our magnitudes tell us about the work disincentive effects of the food stamp program? How do our results compare to the literature?
Our preferred estimates use the pooled sample and the triple difference specification (Tables 4 and 5) , as this takes advantage of the universal nature of the FSP program. However, the existing food stamp literature does not provide any estimates for comparison. As a check and to gauge the magnitude of the expected labor supply effects of the food stamp program, we simulated the impact of the program on annual hours worked in our PSID sample using estimated labor supply elasticities from the Negative Income Tax experiments (Robins and West 1983) . The simulations for the full nonelderly sample predicted a 20-24 hour reduction in annual hours, which scaled up by the group FS participation rate implies about a 300 hour reduction in hours for participating households. This is quite similar to our (insignificant) estimated reduction in Table 4 . Overall, we take this as a useful exercise which corroborates our estimates of modest work incentive effects in the food stamp program in the full sample.
26
In the female headed household subsamples where we find our largest and most robust estimates, there is more scope to compare our results to the literature. We focus on the results for 26 More specifically, we assign the compensated wage and income effects based on family type (female headed households are assigned the effects for "single females" and all male headed singles/families are assigned the effects for "husbands"). We assign maximum food stamp benefits and the food stamp breakeven income level by family size using the 1975 food stamp parameters in Table 2 .2 from MacDonald (1977) . The change in net wages is -0.3 reflecting the food stamp benefit reduction rate. We assume no nonlinear response to the implementation of food stamps and therefore simulate the change in hours for those families with head's earnings below the food stamps breakeven point. Full results of the simulation are available on request.
annual hours, since that is the measure used in the literature. The Table 4 results show an increase in hours of 183-238 for all female heads, implying a TOT impact of 500-600 hours per year (or more than a 50 percent reduction). This is considerably larger than the Fraker and Moffitt (1988) 
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper we present evidence on the work incentive effects of food stamps, the largest cash or near-cash transfer program in the safety net. This paper provides an important contribution to the literature on work incentives of social welfare programs, and is the first paper on employment effects of the food stamp program that uses a quasi-experimental research design. X Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on the food stamp implementation dummy multiplied by a group food stamp participation rate. The food stamp implementation dummy equals one if the county-year observation had a food stamp program in place by January of that year. The group food stamp participation rate is calculated for each education-race-marital status-presence of children cell using the 1976-78 PSID. The sample includes all years 1968-78 and excludes observations from Alaska. For details on this sample selection, see text. All outcome variables correspond to annual measures taken as of the interview (in spring of the interview year). Demographic controls include dummies for education, number of children, number of adults, race, urban location and state unemployment rate. 1960 county variables include log of population, percent of land in farming, percent of population black, urban, age<5, age>65 and with income less than $3,000, each interacted with a linear time trend. Per capita county transfer income comes from the BEA REIS and includes measures for public assistance (AFDC, General Assistance), medical care (Medicare, Medicaid, military), and retirement and disability benefits. Estimates are weighted using the PSID weight and clustered on county. Standard errors are in parenthesis and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year observation had a food stamp program in place in that year. Data are from 1960-1980 Census county-level STF files. Counties in Alaska are dropped because of missing data on food stamp program start dates. Demographic controls include dummies for education, number of children, number of adults, race, urban location and state unemployment rate. 1960 county variables include log of population, percent of land in farming, percent of population black, urban, age<5, age>65 and with income less than $3,000, each interacted with a linear time trend. Per capita county transfer income comes from the BEA REIS and includes measures for public assistance (AFDC, General Assistance), medical care (Medicare, Medicaid, military), and retirement and disability benefits. Estimates are weighted using the PSID weight and clustered on county. Standard errors are in parenthesis and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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